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Introduction
The debate on OSCE field activities is continuing.
It developed a moderate tone in 2010, although
it had earlier been much sharper. On the eve of
the 2002 Porto Ministerial Council, participating
States decided “to consider, as appropriate, ways of
further improving the functioning and effectiveness
of field operations”.1 Discussions that were, to some
extent, controversial took off in 2003 within the
Informal Open-Ended Group of Friends of the Chair
on Improving the Functioning and Effectiveness of
OSCE Field Operations and continued over several
years. A summary of early disagreements was given
by the Group’s Chair, Ambassador Evelyn Puxley of
Canada.2
The bones of contention have been addressed
many times. Commonly known, these were matters
such as geographic imbalance, the loss of equality
in co-operating with each other and, above all, the
Organization’s allegedly predominant engagement in
human-dimension issues. What Russia called “the
root-cause of the OSCE field crisis” was
“efforts to influence the political processes
in a number of sovereign states, which was
rightly considered as interference into the
internal affairs of these countries”.3
Technically, dissatisfaction was expressed with “the
unwillingness to ensure full transparency” in bud-
getary and extra-budgetary procedures, the “un-
justified autonomy” of heads of missions and their
appointment without the prior consent of the respec-
tive host governments as well as the practice of the
missions’ political background reporting.4
After the intellectual impulse given by the recom-
mendations of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons
(2005)5, reform discussions ended at the Brussels
Ministerial Council (2006) with no significant OSCE
reform completed, while critical discussions contin-
ued. On the other hand, several mandate changes
and especially the successive implementation of new
managerial rules and procedures have considerably
transformed the character of OSCE field operations.
1 What Are the Messages from Astana?
With respect to the subject of this paper, the 2010
OSCE Astana Summit sent encouraging signals to
the OSCE community. First and foremost, this is
about the “vision of a free, democratic, common and
indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security com-
munity stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok,
rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and
common goals” that indicates openness to mutual
responsibility and collective action.6
Second, the profound human-dimension statement
that went beyond the expectation of many observers
makes it possible to continue on-site work within the
Organization’s most sensitive area. Heads of state or
government renewed the mutual assurances given in
Moscow (1991) and Helsinki (1992):
“We reaffirm categorically and irrevocably
that the commitments undertaken in the
field of the human dimension are matters
of direct and legitimate concern to all par-
ticipating States and do not belong exclu-
sively to the internal affairs of the State
concerned. We value the important role
played by civil society and free media in
helping us to ensure full respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy,
including free and fair elections, and the
rule of law.”7
In this respect, the confirmation of “clear standards
for the participating States in their treatment of each
other and of all individuals within their territories”
also answers polemics about ensuring individual or
collective security and particularly the relationship
between human rights, minority rights and the fight
against terrorism.8 It directs activities at tackling
the serious maldevelopment of recent years that
curbs democratic achievements in the OSCE area.
Third, Astana renewed collective commitments in
all three OSCE dimensions and placed additional
emphasis on the broad range of transnational threats
“such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migra-
tion, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
cyber threats and the illicit trafficking in small arms
and light weapons, drugs and human beings”.9 This
directs conceptual thinking on future core themes of
on-site activities.
Fourth, a new geographic accent was given to
the OSCE with the label of a “Euro-Atlantic and
Eurasian security community”.10 This places par-
ticular emphasis on the Asian element of the “in-
tegrated OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladi-
vostok”,11 also including threats from outside the
OSCE area. In particular, the clear call to con-
tribute to “collective international efforts to promote
a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic
Afghanistan” confirms the emerging new geographic
understanding of the OSCE.12
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Fifth, Astana has shown that protracted conflicts
such as those in Georgia have the capacity to take
the entire OSCE community hostage. Disagreement
over their resolution ultimately prevented the adop-
tion of the Astana Framework for Action. The call
by the heads of state or government “to resolve
existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a peaceful
and negotiated manner, within agreed formats, fully
respecting the norms and principles of international
law enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well
as the Helsinki Final Act” must be seen as a direct
request for more on-site efforts. “New crises must be
prevented.”13
Sixth, the largely completed Astana Framework
for Action plus the many proposals submitted in the
Corfu Process now stand ready for the resumption
of talks and action in “a follow-up process within
existing formats” that the Lithuanian and future
incoming Chairmanships have been tasked with or-
ganizing.14
2 What Was Said in the Corfu Process?
The subject matter of OSCE field activities ranged
across all ten thematic Corfu working groups (or
ticks).15 A specific dialogue format on field activities
had not then been established.
Corfu Process: modest attention to field activities
As a topic under discussion, field activities did not
attract significant attention. Field operations were
in much more dispute during the confrontational
reform discussions in 2005/2006 than on the way
from Corfu to Astana. They played a certain role
during the period between late 2009 and early 2010
when food-for-thought papers were being produced.
Later on, only a single two-hour session at the 2010
OSCE Review Conference agenda in October 2010
was dedicated especially to field operations. This
illustrated the modest enthusiasm of most partic-
ipating States for once again opening a Pandora’s
Box.
OSCE field operations: overwhelming support by
most participating States
The Corfu Process and subsequent preparations for
Astana have shown that more than three quarters of
the participating States unconditionally support the
current format and functioning of OSCE field opera-
tions. Forty States including the eight host countries
of field operations Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and
Ukraine declared:
“For the last 18 years, the OSCE Field Op-
erations have been instrumental in assisting
the OSCE and its participating States in
translating political agreements into opera-
tional activities. [. . . ] Let us underline here
that we see no need for a major overhaul
of the system of Field Operations, particu-
larly their reporting lines or working meth-
ods. However, certain adjustments could be
beneficial.”16
Russia’s part: reserved discussion, proposed
guidelines
On the subject of field operations in particular,
Russia engaged in Corfu discussions rather unen-
thusiastically. A food-for-thought paper on “En-
hancing Effectiveness of the OSCE Field Opera-
tions” (PC.DEL/406/10/Corr.3) circulated together
with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, was Rus-
sia’s only significant contribution to the subject.
It contained a proposal on “general guidelines for
OSCE field operation’s activities” with eight draft
paragraphs. General explanations given here were
mainly repetitions of earlier statements and, in part,
lagged behind the factual picture. Critical points
were made about the monitoring of internal po-
litical situations in host countries; cases of failed
conflict management; the spending of funds in a
way not in accordance with mandatory purposes;
opaque appointment procedures of heads of missions
plus the geographic imbalance in the composition of
field operations’ international staff.17 Some of these
details were also addressed in separate papers on the
“Appointment of Heads of OSCE Field Operations”
(PC.DEL/403/10/Corr.4)18 and the “Programme
and Budgetary Planning” (PC.DEL/401/10).19
As Russia generally strives to codify international
co-operation and procedures, it had, at an earlier
point, also suggested the codification of existing
procedural practices, inter alia, “procedures govern-
ing the activities of OSCE institutions and field
operations”.20
The political substance of the “General
Guidelines” may be summarized as follows: non-
interference in internal affairs; the host government’s
right to request a field operation and discontinue
co-operation in case of mandate transgressions;
request for mandatory provisions and governmental
permission for any mission activities; transparency
in the HoM nomination process; limitation of
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monitoring and reporting; time-limitation of on-site
presences and evaluation of missions’ effectiveness.21
***
Altogether, the discussions between Corfu and As-
tana have confirmed once again the overwhelming
support for field activities by most participating
States plus the scepticism of Russia and an un-
expectedly small number of host countries. The
widespread dislike of hosting field operations was
not voiced as bluntly as in years past. Responsible
officers at the Secretariat’s Policy Support Service
do not project any new strategies or formats at the
moment.
Nonetheless, there are solid grounds for discussing
proposals on structural innovation for improved first-
response and mediation capacities and increased
effectiveness. Requirements and proposals of host
countries should be taken seriously. Proposals on
defining guidelines for OSCE field activities should
be discussed in the same open way as field operations
in or with states such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or
Afghanistan or new types of field activities.
Corfu catchwords: conflict management,
effectiveness, regional emphasis
In a summary of the Corfu discussions on field ac-
tivities, the Kazakhstani Chairmanship made three
main points - early warning and conflict prevention,
additional types of presences, and operational effec-
tiveness. Specifically he stated:
“The participating States stressed that the
OSCE field operations can and do play
a critical role in early warning and con-
flict prevention, and welcomed the opportu-
nity to explore further how field operations
might engage in mediation at the local
level, how they could engage on regional
issues and how their analytical capacity
might be strengthened.
Some participating States noted that, even
though field operations are the primary
vehicle for OSCE activities in the field, at
the same time, additional types of presence,
such as support teams, liaison teams and
regional offices, should be explored where
appropriate.
The participating States underscored the
view that, in order for field operations to
continue to be effective, further considera-
tion must be given to how to resource and
manage them.“22
In more detail, the Corfu Process revealed that the
participating States’ collective thinking about OSCE
field activities is primarily along the following lines:
1) Strengthening OSCE executive structures for
managing conflict;
2) Improving quick-response capacities of the
Chairman-in-Office;
3) Increasing the effectiveness of on-site opera-
tions;
4) Engaging in energy-crisis mediation;
5) Discussing the idea of “general guidelines for
OSCE field operation’s activities“;
6) Considering new types of field activities;
7) Refocusing activities regionally: South Cauca-
sus, Central Asia and Afghanistan.
The main opinions and suggestions on these issues
will be discussed in paragraph 4 of this paper.
3 What Are the Trends?
Since the Istanbul Summit in 1999, the overall role
of the OSCE in European security has declined and
so have its field activities.
OSCE generally: declining role since Istanbul
This is possibly a long-term impact of the Western
States’ refusal to make the Organization the conti-
nent’s key security institution as had been intended
by Russia in the early 1990s. In any case, the
resolution of conflicts, the consolidation of newly
independent states along with the increased involve-
ment of the European Union and NATO drove the
OSCE largely out of its core business of security-
building by civilian means. In addition, relations
between Western countries and Russia worsened
between 2000 and 2009. The disappointing outcome
of OSCE reforms in 2005/2006, Russia’s suspension
of the CFE Treaty in December 2007, the election-
observation e´clat between Russia and the ODIHR
in 2007, disputes over Kosovo’s independence in
early 2008, the failure to prevent the Georgian war
in mid-2008 and the Kyrgyz events in June 2010
were only some of the unfortunate milestones of the
complicated post-Istanbul decade.
Field operations: de-politicization and secondary
importance
At the field level, there has been a steady replace-
ment of politically mandated missions by service-
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providing field presences with rather apolitical man-
dates. There is a clear trend to hold OSCE field
operations back from interfering in the internal af-
fairs of host countries. To a great extent, this framed
the substance of the reform discussions in 2005/2006
about curbing political monitoring and background
reporting. Since crucial political matters are handled
by others or are still not taken seriously (e.g., new
threats and challenges), OSCE field activities often
deal with issues of secondary importance.
Field operations: diversified formats
There is no OSCE textbook definition of field opera-
tions. OSCE PR material explains that the OSCE’s
current “18 field operations enable the Organiza-
tion to tackle crises should they arise, and can
also play a critical post-conflict role, helping to
reinforce confidence- and security-building measures.
They foster the administrative capacity of the host
countries through concrete projects that respond to
people and their needs.”23
Over the years, the formats of OSCE field
activities have grown significantly more diversi-
fied. In an earlier paper, CORE labelled them
as first-generation operations (subject: imminent
crisis response) established between 1992 and
1995, second-generation operations (subject: large-
size post-conflict rehabilitation) established since
about 2001 and third-generation operations (sub-
ject: project services; democratization and develop-
ment co-operation) established since about 1995.24
The OSCE distinguishes between field operations
as such – commonly known as classic OSCE field
missions – and field-related activities such as pro-
viding conflict-mediation, giving assistance to imple-
menting bilateral agreements or dispatching personal
representatives of the Chairman-in-Office.25 Field-
related activities are not necessarily permanently
stationed in a host country. They are largely event-
driven or project-based or related to a specific sub-
ject. They include a spectrum of very diverse ele-
ments such as
• individual official visits and more frequent en-
gagement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and
his/her various Personal Representatives (such
as the Personal Representative on the Conflict
Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference) or
Special Envoys;
• individual fact-finding and other political travel-
ling of leading representatives of the delegations
in Vienna and of deputies and representatives of
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly;
• on-site activities of individual OSCE officials
such as the Secretary General, the CPC Director
or the Representative on the Freedom of the
Media (FOM);
• monitoring operations such as election observa-
tion missions or thematic assessment activities
such as those related to the freedom of the
media;
• on-site activities of the OSCE institutions
HCNM and ODHIR ranging from silent diplo-
macy to the aforementioned election observa-
tion;
• on-site project-work directly managed by the
OSCE Secretariat;
• consultancy services of boards or pools of ex-
perts offered via OSCE institutions such as the
ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom
of Religion or Belief;
• roving thematic seminars and conferences such
as the regional seminars that are conducted
annually in preparation for the OSCE Prague
Economic and Environmental Forum;
• services for the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian
Partners for Co-operation such as training of
Afghan border, customs and police officers at
the Training Centre of the Kyrgyz State Cus-
toms Service, the OSCE Border Management
Staff College in Tajikistan or at the Russian
Interior Ministry’s Academy in Domodedovo;
• activities with cross-border mandates and the-
matic profiles such as the OSCE Border Man-
agement Staff College in Tajikistan;
• outsourced activities such as the OSCE
Academy in Bishkek.
Management: sophistication of structures and proce-
dures
The OSCE has steadily developed specialized struc-
tures and procedures for ensuring a transparent
and concise management of the entire Organiza-
tion. Its core is the Unified Budget Process ranging
from the political process at the OSCE Advisory
Committee on Management and Finance (ACMF)
through drafting the Annual Programme Outline to
standardized procedures of recruitment and extra-
budgetary fund-raising to specific formats of plan-
ning, implementing, monitoring, evaluating and au-
diting on-site projects. These are substantial man-
agerial answers to the operational needs of field
activities and to critics’ claims. Project-workers
in the field, on the other hand, deplore an over-
bureaucratization that strains existing capacities.
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Budgets: decreasing absolutely, relatively and shifting
eastwards
Since the OSCE’s operational zenith in 2001, the
Organization’s spending on field operations has con-
tinually declined, both in absolute and relative
numbers. The Organization’s overall unified budget
dropped in nominal terms from approximately 209
million Euros in 2001 down to about 153 million
Euro – or approx. 73% of the 2001 budget – in 2010.
Expenditures on field operations, in particular,
fell from 179.8 million Euros in 2001 to about 98.4
million Euros in 2010 – or approx. 55%. Over the
same period, their share of the annual OSCE Overall
Budget fell from about 85% to roughly 65%.26
Available data shows OSCE budget reductions
in the missions in South Eastern Europe from 95
million Euros (55.9% of the 185.7 million Euros of
the OSCE Unified Budget in 2003) to approx. 62.4
million Euros (40.7% of the 2010 Unified Budget)
and in the South Caucasus from approx. 23 million
Euros (13.5%) to approx. 7.9 million Euros (5.2%)
respectively. These cuts were made in favour of
budget increases in Eastern Europe from 3.2 million
Euros (1.9%) to approx. 6 million Euros (3.9%) and,
above all, Central Asia from 3.2 million Euros (4.0%)
to approx. 16.9 million Euros (11.0%).27
Human resources: decreasing absolutely, relatively
and shifting eastwards
With respect to the Organization’s human resources,
the OSCE Secretary General noted for 2010 that the
“OSCE has crossed a landmark threshold; the total
number of OSCE Post Table positions is projected
to dip below the 3,000 mark to 2,872, representing
a significant decline”.28
This tendency echoes the aforementioned OSCE’s
institutional cutback. In 2001, the OSCE had an
overall workforce of 4,549 budgeted positions in-
cluding 1,525 seconded and contracted international
staff plus 3,024 locally hired staff (national profes-
sionals and general service personnel).29 According
to unofficial OSCE information, the OSCE nominal
workforce had 2,872 posts in late 2010 and included
2,325 employees (approx. 80%) in the field, 1,777 of
whom were locally hired.30
In 2010, in field operations in South Eastern
Europe, the OSCE employed 61.6% of its nominal
staff members, in Eastern Europe 3.7%, in the
South Caucasus 3.9%, and in Central Asia 11.9%.31
Planning for 2011 foresees slight reductions in
South Eastern Europe (down to 60.6%) and slight
increases of 0.2% in each of the three other regions
respectively.32
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OSCE Field Operations in South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe,
the South Caucasus and Central Asia33
Activity
Internat.
Recruited
Staff
Locally
Recruited
Staff
Total
Number of
Staff
Budgets
I. South Eastern Europe: 66,499,00
1. Presence to Albania 25 80 105 3,401,800
2. Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina 63 443 506 15,160,900
3. Mission to Montenegro 13 34 47 2,318,300
4. Mission to Serbia 41 138 179 7,855,300
5. Mission to Kosovo 163 586 749 26,910,000
6. Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje 58 145 203 8,539,900
7. Office in Zagreb 5 22 27 2,312,800
II. Eastern Europe: 5,760,600
8. Office in Minsk 4 7 11 1,032,700
9. Mission to Moldova 13 39 52 1,960,100
10. Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine 4 50 54 2,758,500
11. Representative to the Latvia-Russian
Joint Commision on Military Pensioners
9,300
III. South Caucasus: 13,342,700
12. Office in Baku 13 27 40 2,673,800
13. Office in Yerevan 8 47 55 2,694,900
14. Minsk Process (on Nagamo-Karabakh) 6 11 17 953,300
15. High-Level Planning Group (on Nagamo-
Karabakh, Vienna-based)
192,200
16. Personal Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt
with by the OSCE in Minsk Conference
1,054,900
17. (Mission to Georgia; closed) 5,773,600
IV. Central Asia: 16,421,500
18. Centre in Ashgabat 6 18 24 1,401,700
19. Centre in Astana 5 20 25 2,070,400
20. Centre in Bishkek 20 78 98 5,409,300
21. Office in Tajikistan 27 129 156 5,629,800
22. Project Co-ordination in Uzbekistan 3 16 19 1,910,300
V. Field Operations (Total): 21
activities including 18 field operations
477 1890 2367 107,332,200
VI. OSCE Secretariat and Central
OSCE Institutions
280 266 546 51,344,500
VII. OSCE (Grand Total) 757 2156 2913 158,676,700
(Staff and Budgets as of 2009)
4 What Are the Points for Discussion?
The 2010 part of the Corfu Process was based
on the decision on “Furthering the Corfu Process”
(MC.DEC/1/09).34 The huge number of position
papers that were delivered by the delegations to
the ten working groups (ticks) and the concluding
2010 Review Conference cannot be presented here in
detail. On the other hand, the reports of the Kaza-
khstani Chairmanship give an excellent overview of
the political process within the series of formalized
meetings. For the purpose of this paper, these are
the following documents:
1) Indicative List of Topics and Schedule for
the informal Corfu meetings at Ambassadorial
level in the first half of 2010 (CIO.GAL/13/10)
3 February 2010;
2) Questions to be addressed, Ambassadors’
Corfu Retreat, 12-13 February 2010
(CIO.GAL/17/10) 11 February 2010;
3) Chairmanship’s Food-for-Thought Paper, The
Role of the OSCE in Early Warning, Con-
flict Prevention and Resolution, Crisis Man-
agement and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
(CIO.GAL/22/10) 18 February 2010;
4) Chairmanship’s Perception Paper of the
OSCE Ambassadors’ retreat on the Corfu
Process, St. Martins, 12-13 February 2010
(CIO.GAL/21/10) 18 February 2010;
5) 2010 Annual Security Review Conference,
Concept Paper (CIO.GAL/34/10) 10 March
2010;
6) Chairmanship’s Food-for-Thought Paper,
Strengthening dialogue and co-operation on
energy security in the OSCE area The OSCE
contribution to the international energy
co-operation (CIO.GAL/38/10) 22 March
2010;
7) Chairmanship’s Perception Paper, Transna-
tional and multidimensional threats and chal-
lenges (CIO.GAL/41/10) 26 March 2010;
8) Chairmanship’s Food-for-Thought Paper,
Enhancing the OSCE’s Effectiveness
(CIO.GAL/56/10) 22 April 2010;
9) Chairmanship’s Perception Paper, Role of
the Arms control and CSBMs regimes in
building trust in the evolving security en-
vironment, Corfu Process, 27 April 2010
(CIO.GAL/62/10) 5 May 2010;
10) Chairmanship’s Perception Paper, “Imple-
mentation of all OSCE norms, principles
and commitments”, “Strengthening the cross-
dimensional approach to security” and “Gen-
eral aspects of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian
security” (CIO.GAL/87/10) 18 June 2010;
11) 2011 OSCE Programme Outline. ACMF
Chair’s Perception Paper (CIO.GAL/108/10)
28 June 2010;
12) Copenhagen Anniversary Conference “20
years of the OSCE Copenhagen Document:
Status and future perspectives Copenhagen,
10-11 June 2010”, Chairmanship-in-
Office and Denmark Perception Paper
(CIO.GAL/91/10/Rev.1) 1 July 2010;
13) Chairmanship’s Interim Report. Summarizing
Proposals Put Forward Within the Corfu Pro-
cess (CIO.GAL/117/10) 2 July 2010;
14) Chairperson’s Report, 2010 Annual Security
Review Conference, Vienna, 14 and 16 June
2010, (PC.DEL/780/10) 29 July 2010;
15) Chairmanship Perception Paper on “Interac-
tion with Other Organizations and Institu-
tions on the basis of the 1999 Platform for
Co-operative Security” and “Enhancing the
OSCE’s effectiveness” Corfu Process 15 May
2010, Baden (CIO.GAL/88/10) 18 June 2010;
16) Chairmanship’s Perception Paper on Fur-
ther Efforts to Intensify Co-operation with
Afghanistan (in the Context of Substantive
Content of the OSCE Summit in Astana)
(CIO.GAL/121/10) 7 July 2010;
17) Chairmanship’s Summary of the Vienna
part of the 2010 OSCE Review Conference
Closing Plenary Session 26 October 2010
(RC.DEL/331/10) Vienna 27 October 2010;
18) Chairperson’s Summary of the 2010 Review
Conference (RC.GAL/39/10) Astana 01 De-
cember 2010.
Further dialogue on OSCE field operations should
focus on selected themes highlighted in the Corfu
discussions. Namely, the OSCE should focus on
strengthening executive structures for more effective
conflict management and improving the Chairman-
ship’s quick-response capacities. This leads necessar-
ily to starting talks about an OSCE Constitutive
Document and the Organization’s legal personal-
ity. The idea of “general guidelines for OSCE field
operation’s activities” should be examined in the
same context. In addition, talks should be focused
on increasing the effectiveness of on-site operations.
Tackling transnational threats will have to play a
more significant role. Contrary to earlier recommen-
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dations, discussions should also concentrate on the
special matter of energy-crisis mediation. Finally,
thinking about new formats of field activities, par-
ticularly for addressing the security needs of partic-
ipating States in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia, should be continued. Closer action with and
on Afghanistan should also be considered.
4.1 Strengthening OSCE Executive Structures for
Managing Conflict
Strengthening OSCE executive structures in all
phases of conflict management was a central point
made in the Corfu Process.35 The “lack of collective
will” referred to by the Greek Chairmanship in 2009
has repeatedly “prevented the OSCE from taking
decisive action when the early warning mechanisms
indicated an impending crisis”.36
Various sides therefore called for a review of exist-
ing OSCE mechanisms and instruments for the en-
tire conflict management cycle and improvement of
procedures and structures for quick crisis response.
This was paralleled by suggestions for reviewing
the working methods of the Permanent Council and
the Forum for Security Co-operation in order to
accelerate “the speed of the decision-making process
in crisis situations“.37 (These and other suggestions
about OSCE decision-making bodies cannot be dis-
cussed within the scope of this paper.) The role of
OSCE as a ‘first responder’ became a particularly
important new catchword in the OSCE vocabulary
in this context.38
The Organization’s management has been tasked
with improving its“internal coherence in the support
provided by the SG to the Chairmanship, the pS
and all other OSCE executive structures” and with
“enhanc[ing] the capacities of OSCE executive struc-
tures in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis
management”.39 In brief summary, the delegations’
proposals point in the following directions:
1) Strengthening analytical and other early-
warning and early-action capacities of OSCE
executive structures;
2) Authorizing the Secretary General to initiate/
take crisis-response steps;
3) Establishing CPC conflict-mediation support
and early-warning co-ordination.
Strengthening analytical and other early-warning
and early-action capacities of OSCE executive
structures
Consideration of strengthening analytical and other
early-warning and early-action capacities involves
expanding the Secretariat’s situation-monitoring
and analytical structures, providing the Secretary
General with the right to suggest early actions and
applying appropriate instruments and mechanisms
in given situations.40
Authorizing the Secretary General to initiate/take
crisis-response steps
Some sides suggest strengthening the Secretary Gen-
eral’s role “through expanding his/her functions
and responsibilities beyond the administrative mat-
ters”.41 This would expand the prevailing under-
standing of the Secretary General as service provider
or – in OSCE language – “as Chief Administrative
Officer of the Organization and Head of the OSCE
Secretariat”.42
There are suggestions for authorizing the Secre-
tary General (or the Chairmanship, see paragraph
4.2) with taking his/her own crisis response steps
for example “through the deployment of short-term
missions or by temporarily augmenting existing field
operations”.43 Other suggestions involve increasing
the Secretary General’s authority within the overall
organigram “while respecting the mandates of other
executive structures”.44 The group of EU members
has proposed a more prominent role for him/her
“in defining and implementing multi-year tasks” and
“examin[ing] ways to adjust the present model of
interaction between the Secretary General and the
Chairmanship.”45 Russia is also arguing for strength-
ening the role of the Secretary General.46
Establishing CPC conflict-mediation support and
early-warning co-ordination
The proposal to create a mediation support function
of the Conflict Prevention Centre aims at improving
the Secretariat’s back-office services.47 Developing
the capabilities of the Secretariat and the institu-
tions in early warning plays a very significant role
for many sides. Also suggested is “creat[ing], a priori
within available resources, a CPC-coordinated early
warning system involving the Secretariat, institu-
tions, field operations and personal/special represen-
tatives of the CiO, while maintaining the autonomy
of all the actors involved.”48
***
8
All of these proposals touch upon the complicated
managerial structure of the Secretariat. They require
fundamental reflections on the mutual complemen-
tarity of the Secretary General, the CPC Director,
the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environ-
mental Activities (CEEA), the Special Representa-
tive and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings (THB) and the Representative on
Freedom of the Media (FOM). This also touches
upon these institutions’ responsibilities vis-a`-vis the
OSCE decision-making bodies and the OSCE Chair-
manship as well as their relationship to the HCNM,
the ODIHR Director and the Heads of field opera-
tions. Affected as well are the internal thematic co-
ordination within the Secretariat and the compati-
bility of its structural units and proposals such as
establishing a TNT Directorate which “would con-
solidate the work of the existing thematic units”.49
These proposals require the parallel consideration of
suggestions on enhancing the role of the Permanent
Council in the conflict cycle, inter alia, through
discussing reports of the Chairmanship and the
Secretary General, dispatching fact-finding or short-
term missions, convening emergency PCs, special
closed PCs or meetings of informal groups, con-
vening extraordinary conferences under the Berlin
Mechanism in case of armed conflict or arranging
joint PC/FSC meetings.50 In total, they stipulate
fundamental rearrangements that might possibly be
laid down in an OSCE Constitutive Document.
4.2 Improving Quick-Response Capacities of the
Chairman-in-Office
The second Kyrgyz crisis (June 2010) revealed once
again the problem of strictly sticking to the OSCE
consensus principle while simultaneously improv-
ing the Chairman-in-Office’s ability to react au-
tonomously to dynamic situations. Moreover, it ex-
posed systemic difficulties the OSCE faces in case of
a Chairmanship’s partiality towards a neighbour’s
internal affairs and fears of counter effects on the
Chairmanship’s own country.
Consolidating political leadership in crisis response
Proposals to consolidate political leadership in crisis
response involved the improvement of co-ordination
mechanisms between Chairmanship, Troika, Secre-
tariat, OSCE institutions, field operations and spe-
cial representatives.51 They also involved calls to
increase the Chairmanship’s flexibility and compe-
tences:
“Though decision-making by consensus re-
mains a founding principle of our Organi-
zation, many delegations stressed the need
for prompt action in cases of impending
crisis, which should be addressed through
allowing the Chairmanship to exercise more
effective leadership.”52
The crux of the matter lies in suggestions to autho-
rize the Chairman to carry out limited on-site activ-
ities in sensitive situations without PC agreement.
There are proposals to permit the Chairmanship
to “augment field operations and/or deploy expert
teams in close consultation with participating States,
keeping the PC fully informed”.53 Some propose in-
stituting thematic stand-by Groups of Experts that
would be set in motion by the Chairmanship in given
situations.54 This could, then, possibly be trans-
formed into standing invitations to such teams.55
Others advise improving the “system of reporting
in times of a crisis”.56 Suggestions to increase the
role of the Chairmanship (and the Secretary General
as mentioned above) in crisis situations create a
problem as pointed out by the Kazakhstani Chair-
manship: “An appropriate balance should be found
between early action in crisis situations and the
consensus principle.”57
4.3 Increasing the Effectiveness of On-Site
Operations
Critics of the OSCE have repeatedly stated that this
all-inclusive Organization is not an effective security
enforcer – by contrast to non-inclusive organizations
such as NATO. While the OSCE will never be a
security guarantor, increasing the effectiveness of its
field operations was another topic arising naturally
in the course of the Corfu Process. The Kazakhstani
Chairmanship pointed to the multifaceted range of
positions in this respect stating that “proposals to
strengthen the effectiveness of field activities ranged
from proposals to expand the OSCE’s field presences
in some regions to calls for gradual transfer of their
responsibilities to host countries”.58
From early statements in 2002 through controver-
sial reform talks in 2005 and beyond, numerous pro-
posals of delegations and OSCE officials have been
put into practice, step by step.59 Most OSCE field
operations now are designed as service-providers
that mainly work through implementing assistance
projects at the request of governments. This is also
the case for operations in post-conflict situations
such as the missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
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Serbia, Kosovo, Skopje (FYROM) and the Office
in Zagreb, the Mission to Moldova, the Centre in
Bishkek and the Office in Tajikistan. Inside the
Organization itself, there is an aggravating mismatch
between the requirements of project-based security
work and existing managerial structures and man-
power. This has been discussed repeatedly.
One particularly critical point in efficiency dis-
cussions concerns the termination of field activities.
Critics refer to the provisions of the Charter for
European Security, par. 41, where national capacity-
building and the transfer of capacity and expertise
to the host country are seen as prerequisites for the
possible termination of field operations:
“The host country of an OSCE field opera-
tion should, when appropriate, be assisted
in building its own capacity and exper-
tise within the area of responsibility. This
would facilitate an efficient transfer of the
tasks of the operation to the host country,
and consequently the closure of the field
operation.”60
There are proposals to assess “the effectiveness of
the OSCE field operations’ activities based on the
analysis of the implementation of paragraph 41 of
the Charter for European Security”.61
The Platform for Co-operative Security (Istanbul
1999) with other international organizations and
development agencies has been discussed again and
again as a factor in effectively running OSCE oper-
ations. Now as before, this involves a loose format
of largely declaratory character, with weak institu-
tional links and with no “hierarchy of organizations
or a permanent division of labour among them”.62
In the Corfu Process, the Platform was mentioned in
the typical enthusiastic way as non-institutionalized
“but still dynamic interaction”.63
Intentions of reviving the Platform idea have
met with strategic difficulties. Even within the
core groups of the OSCE’s most significant part-
ners/competitors, EU and NATO, positions are as
non-homogeneous as before. Neither organization
has formulated a fundamental strategic interest in
the OSCE nor are they structurally prepared for the
systematic use of the OSCE. Issues with Russia are
settled bilaterally. The EU calls, at least rhetorically,
for co-operation with the OSCE and other interna-
tional organizations to establish “a more effective
multilateral global order [as. . . ] a primary security
objective of the EU”.64 It sees regional issues – espe-
cially“[t]ackling crises and protracted conflicts in the
neighbourhood” – as the obvious area for pragmatic
EU/OSCE on-site work in selected cases.65 NATO,
on the other hand, does not even mention the OSCE
in its new Strategic Concept for the Defence and
Security (November 2010).66 The interest of the US
in European security affairs appears to be fading
and it finds its capacities bound up in other parts
of the world. Russia’s OSCE-related positions vary
from undecided to critical.
The strict civilian design of OSCE operations
had been discussed at earlier times. It does not
play a role in current thinking but may perhaps
do so in future. The OSCE runs only unarmed
operations that, at best, include military compo-
nents or military staff.67 In particular situations,
they complement other organizations’ armed efforts
as international conflict management at the Balkans
has shown, otherwise they contribute to preventing
open conflict, or support long-lasting peace pro-
cesses. OSCE field operations may “involve civilian
and/or military personnel, may range from small-
scale to large-scale, and may assume a variety of
forms including observer and monitor missions and
larger deployments of forces [and may. . . ] be used,
inter alia, to supervise and help maintain cease-
fires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the
maintenance of law and order, to provide human-
itarian and medical aid and to assist refugees”.68
Initially designed as CSCE peacekeeping operations
within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter
of the United Nations, they were explicitly limited
to “not entail enforcement action”.69 In another
interpretation, the aforementioned OSCE definition
of peacekeeping is, on the contrary, “both broad
and flexible”.70 The Charter for European Security
(Istanbul 1999) reflects on taking either a leading
role in peacekeeping, or providing the “mandate
covering peacekeeping by others” or providing “a co-
ordinating framework for such efforts”.71
4.4 Engaging in Energy-Crisis Mediation
The Corfu Process has put energy security back
at top of the OSCE agenda. To many participat-
ing States, supply disruptions during the Russian-
Ukrainian gas conflicts in 2005/2006 and 2008/2009
demonstrated the alarming dynamics of energy
emergencies. There are substantial requirements for
creating functioning channels of communication be-
tween producer, consumer and transit countries in
sensitive situations as well as other essentials that
generally concern transparency, predictability and
stability of global energy markets. This could be-
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come a task for the OSCE.
For good reasons, the OSCE as a non-technical
organization has so far developed only awareness-
raising activities under the OSCE Energy Security
Dialogue accepting that “hard” energy issues are
handled either uni- or bilaterally or through interna-
tional expert organizations, commercial enterprises
and governmental offices.
Some participating States are now convinced that
there is an essential niche for the OSCE in devel-
oping capacities for early warning and mediation
on energy security. They also propose developing
CSBMs in this field. Discussions started in 2009 with
proposals for “assisting participating States in the
protection of critical energy infrastructure, serving
as a ‘clearing house’ for information sharing and
exchange of best practices, and developing early
warning mechanisms in the energy field” or taking
the role as a “watchdog”.72 Particular proposals are
outlined in paragraph 4.7.
4.5 Discussing the Idea of “General Guidelines for
OSCE Field Operation’s Activities”
As mentioned in the introduction, Russia’s food-for-
thought paper on “Enhancing Effectiveness of the
OSCE Field Operations”with the proposal for elabo-
rating “general guidelines for OSCE field operation’s
activities” is its key contribution to the Corfu Pro-
cess on the subject of OSCE field operations.73 The
“General Guidelines” with their eight drafted para-
graphs and two supplementary papers on the “Ap-
pointment of Heads of OSCE Field Operations”74
and the “Programme and Budgetary Planning”75
represent a conceptual offer for future discussion
that should be used.
4.6 Refocusing Regional Activities: South
Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan
As shown in the introduction, the attention of the
OSCE has been shifting eastwards for a number of
years. Although field operations in South Eastern
Europe still consume 40.7% of the OSCE overall
budget and involved 61.6% of the OSCE’s nominal
working staff in 2010, there is a clear trend.76 As
the planning shows this regional trend will carry
on in 2011.77 The 2011 Lithuanian Chairmanship
anticipates its continuation as well.
The Lithuanian Chairmanship’s formula for main-
taining field operations during its tenure is in briefest
summary “streamlining and consolidation” for South
Eastern Europe. “[T]he general level [. . . ] should be
kept” for Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus,
and“continuity and focus”plus“more flexibility with
respect to quick enhancement of existing resources
and capabilities” are the aims for Central Asia.78
Efforts in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus
and Central Asia will have to focus on media-
tion in protracted conflicts, addressing transnational
threats and providing capacity-building services to
governments and other relevant partners.
After Georgia in 2008 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010,
mediating in protracted conflicts in Eastern Europe
and particularly in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia has attracted the attention of many sides, more
so than in previous years. In summarizing the Corfu
discussions, the Kazakhstani Chairmanship declared
it again “a priority for the Organization”.79 The
Lithuanian Chairmanship 2011 anticipates the same
and sees special tasks in settling the Transdniestrian
conflict within the 5+2 format, using the Geneva
Discussions and aiming “at extending OSCE ac-
tivities in Georgia, including through a meaningful
OSCE presence”, maintaining the Minsk process on
Nagorno-Karabakh as well as “confidence and secu-
rity building measures as a key element facilitating
the settlement of protracted conflicts”.80
In the South Caucasus, the already cited re-
opening of“a meaningful OSCE presence” in Georgia
is emblematic for many sides as is the final launch-
ing of the Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan.
The case of Nagorno-Karabakh and swelling sabre
rattling between Armenia and Azerbaijan keep the
region high on the OSCE agenda as do complicated
developments in the neighbouring Russian North
Caucasus.
With special relevance for the three regions, OSCE
planning for 2011 suggests addressing “inter- and
intra-State confrontations or violent incidents trig-
gered by popular unrest, scarcity of resources, or
radicalism, intolerance and discrimination”as well as
“crisis situations triggered by political instability”.81
Thematically, countering transnational threats
and challenges needs to play a more dominant role
in on-site activities particularly in these regions.
Efforts at combating terrorism, organized crime and
drug trafficking, border security/management, cyber
security, countering proliferation and police-related
activities should be formatted as service offers to
governments and civil societies. Establishing insti-
tutions with regional mandates on these subjects
should be discussed. The 2011 Programme Out-
line puts these subjects in the context of cross-
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dimensional and cross-institutional activities.82
The general trend in the OSCE to shift resources
eastwards and especially to Central Asia has been
described above. Considerations about future OSCE
on-site activities here should necessarily take into
account the specific requirements of the five Cen-
tral Asian countries. They are essential for Euro-
pean security as is an improvement in the situation
in adjoining Afghanistan. The Kazakhstani Chair-
manship has exhaustively summarized proposed for-
mats and topics to intensify the co-operation with
Afghanistan, which is wanted by many, but is also
viewed sceptically by other sides.83
4.7 Considering New Types of Field Activities
Changing security situations in and between par-
ticipating States will require new formats for on-
site operations. In reflecting on the results of the
OSCE 2010 Review Conference, the Kazakhstani
Chairmanship pointed out that, in this respect, “ad-
ditional types of presence, such as support teams,
liaison teams and regional offices, where appropriate,
should be explored”.84
As a matter of fact, field activities already cover,
both on paper and in reality, a greater spectrum of
concepts, structures and activities that go beyond
classic OSCE field missions. This was shown in
paragraph 3 above. Proposals made within the Corfu
Process on new types of field activities could be
categorized in the following way:
1) Establishing early-warning formats;
2) Establishing energy security instruments;
3) Dispatching special teams;
4) Conducting direct on-site action of OSCE in-
stitutions;
5) Conducting new forms of confidence-building
measures (CBMs);
6) Conducting roving events;
7) Conducting regional measures.
4.7.1 Establishing Early-Warning Formats
Since improving OSCE early-warning capabilities
has been a priority topic on the Corfu agenda, pro-
posed is picking up the idea of conducting/estab-
lishing a
1) Seminar on“Improving the Methodology
for Early Warning, Conflict Prevention
and Crisis Management with former Heads
of Missions, former CiO Special/Personal Rep-
resentatives and mission members”85 or a sem-
inar on “Improving OSCE Mechanisms for
Quick Crisis Response”86 and, in particular, a
Greek proposal on introducing “a more flexible
and ‘prompt-reaction’ mechanism” especially
under the specific consideration of the cross-
dimensional nature of conflicts.87
2) A joint PC/FSC Working Group on re-
viewing conflict-management mechanisms and
procedures.88
In particular, there is, inter alia, the proposi-
tion to consider establishing in the actual field:
3) Mediation and arbitration mechanisms
with respect to national minorities in
inter-state relations. “States should make
good use of all available domestic and inter-
national instruments in order to effectively
address possible disputes and to avert con-
flicts over minority issues. This may include
advisory and consultative bodies such as mi-
nority councils, joint commissions and rele-
vant international organizations. Mediation or
arbitration mechanisms should be established
in advance through appropriate bilateral or
multilateral agreements.”89
4) HCNM Early Warning on Migration.
“The capabilities of the High Commissioner
on National Minorities should be strengthened.
More work could be conducted, for example, in
relation to movements of populations, which
provided useful early warning signals regard-
ing deteriorating human-rights situations and
looming conflicts.”90
5) HCNM Early Warning Monitoring Net-
works. Expanding HCNM monitoring net-
works to further States or cross-border ar-
eas with dangerous inter-ethnic situations has
been proposed.
6) Early-Warning Track II Framework. “A
Secretariat-coordinated framework for system-
atic collection, collation and analysis of early
warning signals from various sources could be
created. Whenever appropriate, inputs of se-
lected external research institutions might be
sought.”91
4.7.2 Establishing Energy-Security Instruments
Because of its particular significance, the issue of
developing energy-security instruments is described
here in a separate paragraph. As explained in par.
4.4., general considerations focus on “assisting par-
ticipating States in the protection of critical energy
infrastructure, serving as a ‘clearing house’ for infor-
mation sharing and exchange of best practices, and
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developing early warning mechanisms in the energy
field” or taking the role as a “watchdog”.92
1) OSCE Energy Security Early Warn-
ing (ESEW) Mechanism. The Mechanism
should include the exchange of information,
consultations, ad hoc fact-finding missions
with OSCE-listed independent experts and re-
porting to the Chairman-in Office.93
2) EITI Support. Supporting the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), as
the US Delegation suggests, could imply the
“promotion of EITI-type transparency princi-
ples in the energy sector” and the facilitation
of “discussion on transparency principles in the
production, transit, and consumption of energy
resources in the OSCE area”.94
3) Chairmanship Energy-Security Expert
Group. As shown under par. 4.7.3., it has been
proposed that thematic Groups of Experts,
inter alia, on energy security that could be
dispatched by the Chairmanship to places of
conflict or emergency, be created.95
4) Confidence-building on energy security.
Also proposed has been the creation of CBMs
in fields such as energy security through“build-
ing contacts and networks; [. . . ] creating assis-
tance and co-operation mechanism; conducting
assistance visits and tabletop exercises; im-
plementing a roster of experts, preparing and
conducting fact finding missions”.96 (See par.
4.7.5.)
4.7.3 Dispatching Special Teams
Extensive proposals have been made on dispatching
special teams to the field that would operate un-
der the responsibility of the Chairmanship or the
Secretary General. Other proposals have thematic
backgrounds. As a general rule, proposals concen-
trate on improving the OSCE’s capability to act as
“first-responder” in crisis situations.
1) Chairmanship Quick-Response Teams.
Deployment of Chairmanship-initiated stand-
by expert teams in case of crisis.97
2) Chairmanship Expert Teams. Specific
“small teams tasked with fact-finding and
dialogue-facilitating missions that could pre-
vent the outbreak of a ‘hot’ conflict” deployed
by the Chairmanship.98
3) Chairmanship’s Thematic Groups of Ex-
perts. Italy has proposed creating thematic
stand-by Groups of Experts on areas such
as military security, energy security, minori-
ties protection or migration management that
could be set in motion by the Chairmanship in
given situations.99
4) Secretary General Short-term Missions.
Crisis response missions initiated or dispatched
by the Secretary General. Suggested in the
same context have been“temporarily augment-
ing existing field operations”.100
5) Re-activating REACT. Russia and the EU
have proposed re-activating the idea of Rapid
Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
(REACT).101 The EU members especially
stress the need“to enable the OSCE to respond
quickly to demands for assistance and for large
civilian and police field operations”.102
6) Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Peace
Support Civilian Operation/Mission.
“Develop a post-conflict rehabilitation and
peace support civilian operation/mission
that seeks to respond coherently, rapidly
and effectively in providing the foundation
for durable, comprehensive security in post-
crisis/post-conflict stages.“103
7) Second-Dimension Assessment Teams.
“Create a roster of independent experts in the
fields of vitally scarce resources and environ-
mental degradation; Dispatch a team of the
above-mentioned experts [. . . ] to make a fair
assessment of the situation in the field and
with the purpose of diffusing tensions.”104
8) FOM Fact-Finding Task Force. The Rep-
resentative on Freedom of the Media should be
enabled to follow up issues and take steps on
dangerous developments within his/her man-
date. “In the wake of events having serious
implications for media freedom [. . . participat-
ing States] may request the Representative on
Freedom of the Media to form a fact-finding
task force of at least three persons [. . . ] When
possible, and with the approval of the pS con-
cerned, the Task Force should visit the pS to
make a first person assessment.”105
4.7.4 Conducting Direct On-Site Action of OSCE
Institutions
The range of activities that OSCE institutions con-
duct directly in the field has been shown under para-
graph 3. They can be developed in all three OSCE
dimensions conditional on participating States’ par-
ticular requests and the requirements of situations
of emergency.
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4.7.5 Conducting New Forms of
Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
During the Corfu Process a proposal was made to ap-
ply the good experience with confidence and security
building measures (CSBMs) to new field-related ac-
tivities. Thus, a “targeted review of core mechanisms
[. . . was] suggested, including among others informa-
tion exchange, risk reduction, contacts, notification
of specific activities and verification of existing doc-
uments on CSB”, especially with respect to “crisis
and conflict situations at inter- and intra-state level
as well as the different phases of a conflict”.106 The
“development of regional CSBMs and arms control”
played a particular role here.107
1) Sub-regional CSBMs. “Following the exam-
ple of the Dayton Agreement on sub-regional
Arms Control (Art. IV Annex 1-B) new sub-
regional CSBMs for protracted conflicts in
the OSCE area could cover the areas where
application of existing instruments is not yet
possible.”108
2) Non-military CBMs. Creating CBMs in
fields like cyber or energy security through
“building contacts and networks; [. . . ] creat-
ing assistance and co-operation mechanisms;
conducting assistance visits and tabletop exer-
cises; implementing a roster of experts, prepar-
ing and conducting fact finding missions”.109
3) Second-Dimension CBMs. “Activities of
the EED have already been used as CBMs,
namely in solving cross-border tensions on eco-
nomic and environmental issues or by using
an economic activity to get two parties of a
conflict together. Assessment missions on wild-
fires and the integrity of energy and water
infrastructure contributed in the past to eas-
ing frictions on the ground and do belong to
the OSCE acquis.”110 A good example for an
economic CBM is the recent resumption of the
train line connecting Chisinau, Tiraspol and
Odessa.
4) Confidence-Building Agency. Establish “a
special autonomous agency in the OSCE that
would act as the OSCE Foundation for the con-
fidence building measures [. . . that] should be
able to act in the name of the OSCE [and. . . ]
can be instrumental in facilitating the conflict
resolution, particularly through the building of
confidence among the communities affected by
the conflicts”.111
5) Confidence-Building Monitors. Stationing
OSCE confidence-building monitors at Cen-
tral Asian border-crossing points. “The mon-
itors would promote best practices, utilizing
the soon-to-be-published UNECE/OSCE bor-
der crossings handbook, which is aimed at
streamlining customs and other border proce-
dures, increasing the effectiveness of security
checks against illicit trafficking and reducing
corruption.”112
6) Joint Table-Top Exercise. “Another way to
achieve a better understanding and interoper-
ability would be to establish a practice of joint
table-top exercises focusing on specific crises
scenarios in the OSCE area.”113
4.7.6 Conducting Roving Events
Roving field activities were thoroughly discussed
during the talks on reform in 2005. Some years
beforehand, this started with the idea of Roving
Ambassadors. Now being proposed is considering
conducting roving thematic events such as seminars.
This kind of activity already exists in the form
of second-dimension regional seminars for preparing
the OSCE Prague Economic and Environmental
Forum. Specifically, conducting a “Freedom of Move-
ment Expert Meeting for Consular and Immigration
Practitioners”114 could be proposed.
4.7.7 Conducting Regional Measures
The OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons has already
proposed that “the OSCE could consider developing
a new type of thematic mission that could look
at a specific issue in one country, or ensure coher-
ence in the work in a broader regional/sub-regional
context”.115 “Considering the possibility of thematic
missions in an OSCE-wide or sub-regional context”
was decided upon in Ljubljana.116 The Corfu Process
brought about a revival of these ideas.
1) OSCE Regional Second-Dimension Cen-
tre in Central Asia. The US Delegation
has proposed the establishment of an OSCE
Regional Second-Dimension Centre in Cen-
tral Asia, perhaps comparable with the OSCE
Academy in Bishkek or the OSCE Border Man-
agement Staff College in Tajikistan.
2) Thematic regional efforts on transna-
tional threats. Respective efforts should fo-
cus on combating terrorism, combating org-
anized crime/drug trafficking; border security/
management; cyber security; countering pro-
liferation. In structural terms, a particular
proposal is developing regional co-ordination
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mechanisms on police-related assistance such
as the existing Regional Coordination Council
in South-Eastern Europe.117
3) Thematic regional co-operation. The
OSCE should intensify co-operation with “or-
ganizations operating in our area” as par-
ticipating States intended within the Astana
Framework for Action. In the Corfu Process,
it was, inter alia, suggested that the OSCE
augment activities of the UNODC’s Central
Asian Regional Information and Coordina-
tion Center (CARICC)“by providing capacity-
building and training assistance through its
field missions and academies in Central Asia,
while emphasizing the involvement of Afghan
officials”.118
5 Final Remarks
The gradual decline of open conflict in Europe was
one of the reasons for questioning the necessity
of fostering security and co-operation through the
OSCE. Anticipation of future conflicts may again
reverse this trend. Increasing competition over en-
ergy and natural resources, asymmetric economic
and demographic developments, tensions on socio-
economic grounds, and maldevelopment in precar-
ious or failing states may also keep the OSCE on
the stage. Transnational threats including those from
outside the OSCE area require a collective European
response. The Corfu Process and the Astana Summit
have shown increased common awareness of these
challenges. However, there are still very different
opinions on how to meet them, including on the role
of the OSCE’s field operations. Consultations on the
many proposals submitted under the Corfu Process
should continue in “a follow-up process within exist-
ing formats” to be organized by the Lithuanian and
future incoming Chairmanships.119
***
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